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PARTING SHOT
The 
Chicago 
Plan
and the Question 
of Money
By Deepika Deshpande
The World Debt Clock is ticking 
away. The real problem is not 
how the debt is funded but 
whether it is sustainable.
The global financial crisis has 
provided much fodder for reflection 
and analysis into our system of money 
and finance. From banker salaries and 
capital adequacy ratios to accounting 
methodologies and the failings of the 
discipline of economics, there has 
been a good deal of thinking into areas 
that may need reform. There has been 
plenty of regulatory overhaul as well. 
Amidst the lively debate on potential 
solutions to economic crises, one idea 
stands out for its theoretical elegance. 
Interestingly, this idea first came 
up in the aftermath of the crash of 1929 
and, despite not finding its way into 
the various policy reforms under the 
New Deal, it has repeatedly featured in 
discussions during every banking crisis 
since then. More recently, against the 
backdrop of the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) released a working paper with an 
updated version of the same plan adapted 
to current economic conditions. And 
in his latest book The End of Alchemy: 
Money, Banking, and the Future of the 
Global Economy, Mervyn King recommends 
this solution as the ultimate answer to 
WKH VWUXFWXUDO ÁDZV LQ WRGD\·V V\VWHP RI
money and banking. 
So, what was this radical proposal? 
And would it be the ultimate solution 
that ends institutional temptations and 
addresses many economic woes? 
The Chicago Plan
In the slew of bank failures that followed 
the crash of 1929, a radical resolution 
was put forward by a group of eminent 
economists from the University of 
&KLFDJR 7KH ¶&KLFDJR 3ODQ· DV LW ZDV
commonly called, appeared as a six-
page limited circulation document 
WLWOHG ¶%DQNLQJ DQG &XUUHQF\ 5HIRUP·
in March 1933, with a second revised 
version published in November in 
the same year. So radical was the 
recommendation that despite having the 
backing of prominent economists like Irving 
)LVKHUDQG+HQU\6LPRQV WKHÀUVWYHUVLRQ
ZDV FLUFXODWHG DV D FRQÀGHQWLDO GUDIW
The central idea of the Chicago Plan 
was “to make money independent of 
loans; that is, to divorce the process of 
creating and destroying money from the 
business of banking”1 and place money 
creation under full sovereign control. 
This is radically different to the fractional 
reserve banking system in place today, 
which requires banks to maintain a 
FHUWDLQ SHUFHQWDJH RI WKHLU FXVWRPHUV·
deposits as reserves with the central 
bank and lend out the rest. Bank loans 
are typically disbursed by crediting 
deposit accounts and therefore add to 
the total stock of money. In fact, over 
90 percent of the money in modern 
economies is created by commercial 
banks through the lending process. 
The Chicago Plan targeted this 
precise feature of the current banking 
system. It recommended the abolition 
of fractional reserve banking and 
required banks to hold 100 percent 
reserves against demand deposits, 
effectively ending all lending by banks. 
,W VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH HFRQRP\·V OHQGLQJ
requirements could be met through a 
different set of institutions that would 
be funded out of equity investments, 
similar to modern day mutual funds. 
Investments in such lending institutions 
would obviously not be guaranteed. 
Proponents of the Chicago Plan argued 
that this solution would improve the 
safety of banks, reduce the occurrence of 
recessions and improve the effectiveness 
of monetary policy by putting money 
creation where it belongs, i.e., in the 
hands of the state. 
Restricting the ability of banks to 
alter money supply through the lending 
process may seem intuitively appealing, 
especially given their role in the most 
UHFHQWÀQDQFLDO FULVLV5LVN\ LQYHVWPHQWV
high leverage and indiscriminate 
lending all contributed to a debt bubble 
which, when burst, sent shock waves 
through the global economy, from which 
we have not yet recovered. In fact, 
separating money from debt seems like 
the perfect engineering solution to 
controlling the unbridled growth of 
leverage today. 
However, a deeper examination of 
this model also leads to a provocative 
contradiction. While the Chicago Plan 
seeks to separate the creation of money 
from the creation of debt, history 
unambiguously suggests the inseparability 
of the two. In fact, money has been, 
and is even today, nothing but 
transferable debt. Its creation, destruction 
and quality are inexorably linked to 
the underlying debt and the quality of 
the debtor. The form of money and 
the nature of the lender are then 
just cosmetic embellishments. How odd 
then, that the Chicago Plan should try 
to separate the two. 
Money as debt
The popular understanding of economic 
history places the evolution of barter, 
money and debt in chronological order. 
This view suggests that money came 
about as an improvement over the 
prevailing barter system and that the 
lending of money led to the birth of 
debt. In reality, barter probably had a 
very limited existence and money came 
about as a mechanism to record debt. 
If this is true, tackling the question of 
money should involve tackling the 
question of debt and not the other way 
round (refer to box story).
The early forms of state-issued 
money were either made of or backed by 
precious metal. With the introduction 
of paper money came a crucial difference— 
it was no longer backed by bullion. 
7RGD\·V PRQHWDU\ V\VWHP RI ILDW PRQH\ 
thus rests solely on trust in the modern 
state. In fact, fiat money attracts very 
high seignorage (i.e., profit made by a 
government by issuing currency, especially 
the difference between the face value of 
coins and their production costs) since 
it is not based on any precious metal. While 
the process of creating money may be 
far more sophisticated today than in 
medieval times, the effect is the same—
excessive seignorage erodes public 
confidence in money and generates 
LQÁDWLRQDU\ SUHVVXUHV
Although money creation is today 
in the hands of central banks that are 
independent of the government, things 
GRQ·W DOZD\VZRUN WKDWZD\ ,Q IDFW ,0)
research suggests that weak governments 
that cannot finance their expenditures 
through taxes or debt often end up 
relying on seignorage. According 
to an IMF report, “Greater political 
instability leads to higher seignorage, 
especially in developing, less democratic, 
and socially polarised countries with high 
inflation, low access to domestic and 
H[WHUQDO GHEW ÀQDQFLQJ DQGZLWK KLJKHU
turnover of central bank presidents.”2
Systemic risk: Too big to fail
The Chicago Plan assumes that lending 
by non-banks would put risk-taking 
squarely in the hands of the investors 
in those institutions. In other words, 
since they are not holders of guaranteed 
deposits, they can be made to absorb losses. 
This again may be theoretically correct 
but is not borne out by actual experience. 
If lending goes dangerously awry 
and starts posing systemic risk, practical 
considerations often require governments 
Separating money  
from debt seems like 
the perfect engineering 
solution to controlling 
the unbridled growth  
of leverage today.
THE HISTORY OF MONEY
The economic history of humankind can be 
legitimately traced back to an event that 
probably occurred some 10,000 years ago 
when Man, the hunter gatherer, began to 
settle down in agrarian societies. The arrival of 
agricultural settlements spawned the beginning 
of division of labour and specialisation and, 
therefore, the first forms of commerce. The 
popular view holds that barter was the original 
solution to support the exchange of goods. 
Hence, for instance, a butcher and a farmer may 
have exchanged meat for corn. While this may 
seem plausible, historical and anthropological 
evidence, as well as deeper reasoning suggest 
otherwise. 
Among its many limitations, barter is based on a 
coincidence of needs and hence, while barter may 
have operated on the fringes, it is very unlikely to 
have supported any wider form of commerce. The 
butcher may have needed corn, but the farmer 
may not have needed meat. Therefore, the solution 
that these early Neolithic societies were trying to 
develop was a way to record the debt 
of the butcher to the farmer. Cowrie 
shells, cattle, dried cod and other early 
forms of money were most likely serving 
the functional utility of recording debt. 
So, the butcher handed over a couple 
of cowrie shells to the farmer to record 
his debt. The farmer, who may have needed 
vessels for food storage, in turn handed them 
over to a potter to record his debt. 
Gradually the cowrie shells became 
separated from the original creator of 
debt by many orders and assumed 
their own life as ‘money’. But the origin of that 
money was unquestionably linked to the 
creation of debt. And as long as the debtor 
was trustworthy, the money was good. 
As societies evolved and settlements developed 
into kingdoms, the rudimentary forms of money 
were replaced by shining pieces of metal that 
we call coins. It was the same thing in a different 
form and with a crucial difference—the king, as 
the sovereign authority, assumed the power to 
issue and provide a guarantee for these coins 
and hence the coins functioned on the basis 
of trust in the king. A surrogate for sovereign 
risk was that the coins were created from or 
backed by precious metal. 
to step in to contain the political and 
HFRQRPLF IDOORXW ¶7RR ELJ WR IDLO· GRHV
not only apply to banks. Two of the 
biggest bailouts during the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008 were for the 
PRUWJDJH UHÀQDQFLQJ DJHQFLHV )UHGGLH
Mac and Fannie Mae, and for the 
insurance company, AIG. It is not 
difficult to find similar examples closer 
to home as well. One of the largest ever 
bailouts in India was not for a bank, 
but for Unit Trust of India, the oldest 
and largest mutual fund company in 
the country. 
Even within the banking system, 
it is very unlikely that separation of 
losses between deposit holders and 
bond holders may be the perfect 
solution. A more recent event in 
Europe illustrates this point. The 
taxpayer-funded bailouts of large 
U.S. and European banks during 
the Global Financial Crisis sharply 
brought into focus the moral hazard of 
privatised gains and socialised losses 
in an industry that had indulged in 
excessive risk taking. The European 
8QLRQ·V %DQN 5HFRYHU\ DQG 5HVROXWLRQ
Directive (BRRD) was passed by the 
European Parliament to address this 
issue and all member states were 
required to implement the provisions 
no later than January 2016.  
One of the key provisions of the 
%55' LV WKH ¶EDLOLQ· OHJLVODWLRQ WKDW
requires shareholders and unsecured 
creditors to be bailed-in before other 
forms of money can be accessed to 
While the process of 
creation of money 
may be far more 
sophisticated today 
than in medieval 
times, the effect is 
the same—excessive 
seignorage erodes 
public confi dence in 
money and generates 
infl ationary pressures. 
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save a troubled bank. This appears to be an elegant solution 
WKDW VLJQLÀFDQWO\ UHGXFHV WKH ULVN RI WD[SD\HUIXQGHG EDLORXWV
while adding a potential obligation to the risk component, even 
if that component is dilutive. In fact, the Austrian bank Heta 
was quietly wound up via bail-ins in April 2016. This was 
possible because the relatively small size of the bank meant 
the political and economic impact was limited. That it would 
not work on a larger scale was borne out when the Italian 
banking crisis began to unfold a few months later. The steady 
rise in non-performing loans since 2008 led to the 
VHYHUH SXPPHOOLQJ RI ,WDOLDQ EDQNV· VKDUH SULFHV LQ WKH 
aftermath of Brexit and began to threaten bank solvency. 
Ideally, the bail-in provisions would be the solution to resolve 
the capital positions of these banks. However, according 
to an analysis by The Financial Times, retail investors happened 
to hold from half to a third of subordinated bonds issued by 
banks.3 Penalising a vast base of small savers and pensioners 
would not just be politically unpopular, it could unleash a 
huge crisis in the country. Hence the reluctance of the Italian 
government to invoke these bail-in provisions.
This could be seen as a close parallel to a situation where 
small investors in a lending bank under the Chicago Plan 
face a significant default. While theoretically the investments 
in a lending bank are not guaranteed, any solution that 
involves widespread impact to a vast base of small investors is 
unlikely to work. The real problem is not how the debt is 
funded but whether the debt is sustainable. 
The birth of private money
If issued under the correct principles, money can gain 
spontaneous acceptance irrespective of the issuer. In fact, private 
money other than commercial bank money continues to make its 
appearance when state-issued money becomes dysfunctional. 
On 8 November 2016, when the Indian Prime Minister 
announced the demonetisation of 86 percent of the currency 
in circulation, there was, very expectedly, a significant 
level of disruption in economic activity. However, along with 
the reports of economic disruption were also others of 
the regeneration of private money—of small traders and 
vegetable vendors conducting trade using barter or other 
locally acceptable items for exchange. Within a week, alternate 
forms of exchange cropped up all over the country!
Another example is the Argentinean Peso crisis of 
2002. The pegging of the Argentine Peso to the U.S. dollar 
in 1991 helped usher in a period of price stability and 
economic confidence. However, as the U.S. dollar began 
to appreciate, it became obvious that this arrangement was 
untenable. The rise of the Peso began to hurt exports and 
wreak economic chaos. In 2001, Argentina defaulted on 
US$93 billion of sovereign debt. Growth rate declined, and 
in 2002, the economy contracted by 11 percent, pushing over 
half the population below the poverty line.4 The loss of faith 
in the Peso led to the spontaneous emergence of private money. 
An article in The Financial Times provided a rather entertaining 
commentary of the situation: “As they finish their tea and 
croissants, two elegantly dressed ladies at a Buenos Aires café 
DVN WKHLU ZDLWHU KRZ WKH\ PLJKW SD\ $V LI UHFLWLQJ WKH GD\·V 
menu from memory, the waiter gives them several options: 
pesos, lecops, patacones (but only Series I) and all classes of 
tickets—luncheon vouchers that circulate widely at restaurants 
and supermarkets in the city.”5 Voila!
The debt trap
The Chicago Plan required that banks maintain 100 percent 
reserves against demand deposits. This obviously meant 
that the volume of government liabilities would need to be 
sufficient to match the level of money. And as the economy 
expanded and trade grew, the level of government debt 
would need to grow in tandem. Informational constraints 
and lack of perfect knowledge on the level of trade could 
cause a mismatch in the level of available government debt 
and monetary requirements while mismanagement may 
allow the government to issue money to support its own needs. 
The World Debt Clock, which measures gross government 
debt, stood at US$40 trillion in 2010 and is now past 
US$60 trillion. It would not therefore be out of place to 
ask how long this can continue and at what point will 
excessive leverage cause an economy to hit the skids. 
Satyajit Das, author of A Banquet of Consequences, points 
out that total public and private sector debt in major 
economies is now at 300 percent of GDP. Hence, with 
average interest rates at 2 percent per annum, economies 
need to grow at a nominal rate of 6 percent to cover 
just the interest.6 How many developed economies today 
can we say are able to achieve close to that level of growth?
If money is so inextricably linked to debt, it is unlikely 
that we can have any meaningful and sustainable solution 
for money without factoring in a solution for debt. So, 
what then is that gold solution to debt, one that can end the 
unceasing cycle of economic boom and bust? 
Therein lies the rub! Excessive leverage in itself is 
not the only kind of problem—property bubbles, fiscal 
imbalances, overcapacity in specific sectors and capital 
misallocation are just a few manifestations of the distortions 
caused by debt and each of these requires specific bespoke 
actions. There is no silver bullet and no one ideal policy 
prescription that can address all problems at once. In fact, 
the Chicago Plan, or for that matter, any other innovative 
model for money, may help reorganise the system and 
bring in greater discipline. However, none of these solutions 
alone can address the root of the problem. 
Markets often find diverse ways to wend around 
policy and regulation, irrespective of how well-thought through 
or comprehensive they are. In fact, even some of the newest 
innovations in money, such as cryptocurrencies, do not 
satisfactorily address the fundamental question of how much 
money an economy needs. The Bitcoin ecosystem for 
instance, creates new money (read, new Bitcoins) based on an 
algorithm to reward Bitcoin miners for writing transactions 
onto the digital Blockchain ledger and has an arbitrary cap 
of 21 million Bitcoins. The issuance of new Bitcoins is in no 
way connected to the volume of underlying trade and debt, 
and at some point in the future, when the 21 million Bitcoin 
cap is reached, their value is bound to appreciate, thereby 
FDXVLQJ D GHÁDWLRQDU\ HFRQRPLF LPSDFW
What is required then is a continuous assessment of 
market conditions and the implementation of timely and 
targeted measures to address specific issues. The economy 
is in fact a dynamic living organism and managing it requires 
a good understanding of not just the physiological processes 
internal to the various economic sectors, but also their 
Retail investors happen to hold  
from half to a third of subordinated 
bonds issued by banks. Penalising 
a vast base of small savers and 
pensioners would not just be politically 
unpopular, but could unleash a  
huge crisis in a country.
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interactions to achieve stable equilibrium. There is no one 
cure for all ailments. Policy measures need to be tailored 
and continually adjusted. For example, countries like Singapore 
and Hong Kong have been very effective in controlling 
property bubbles through macroprudential policy actions 
like modifying loan to debt ratios, minimum down payments, 
and stamp duties on second purchases. Other relatively long 
gestation initiatives like financial literacy and credit bureau 
reporting are extremely valuable in building a healthy lending 
ecosystem. While each of these measures may not individually 
look like a solution to the problem of money, they all go 
towards creating a healthy and well-functioning economy, and 
it is only in a healthy economy that a healthy system of money 
can survive. 
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